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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 12/02/2004

Accident number: 121

Accident time: 06:27

Accident Date: 10/05/1999

Where it occurred: Cordon Sanitaire,

Country: Zimbabwe

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: KMS

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 12/02/2004

Date last modified: 12/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)

Accident report
The demining group were clearing the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border minefields at the time
of the accident.
An internal memo reporting on the accident was made available by the demining group in
December 1999. The following summarises its content.
The victim was a Team Leader whose duties included disarming R2M2 mines. At 06:27 the
Victim was "neutralising" an R2M2 mine by removing its booster charge [unscrewed from
below] when the mine detonated. Another Team Leader witnessed the event and reported
that the Victim was wearing his protective equipment (visor and apron) properly.
The blast removed both of the victim's hands and injured both his arms and his lower face. It
damaged the collar of the blast apron and marked the visor, but the victim's face, throat and
chest were believed to have been saved from severe injury by the protective equipment.
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The victim was taken to the on-site medical facility after "10-15" minutes, and from there by
ambulance to hospital [not identified].
The apron is shown below. The dark blue aramid inside the orange cotton cover is clearly
visible on the left of the collar.

The investigators decided that there were two possible reasons for the accident. Either the
victim inadvertently applied pressure to the mine while unscrewing the booster or the
"oxidisation of friction sensitive crystals from the booster" made the mine detonate as he
worked.

Victim Report
Victim number: 157

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: no

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Hand Both
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident has been listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems that
the victim may have been working as directed when the accident occurred. However, if there
was really a danger of crystallisation around the booster causing a detonation through friction
when it was unscrewed (or delayed action of the mechanism) the group's management
should have identified the danger and changed the SOP which called for disarming. See
“Related papers”.
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The disarming SOP is not widely employed throughout the demining industry, but was used
until recently by the largest NGO involved in demining (and is still used in some countries by
that group). Many field people feel that – as long as the final decision on the condition of a
known device rests with them – the procedure is no more dangerous than laying a charge
against the mine. There are not enough disarming/detonating accidents in this database for it
to be used to provide evidence to make a compelling judgement on this issue.
If the victim was inexperienced, poorly trained or poorly supervised, the accident would
illustrate a failure of management. One of the ex-pat supervisors has subsequently stated that
the victim was screwing an unfamiliar booster back into the mine when the accident occurred.
It is possible that the unfamiliar booster was the type with a bayonet-fitting to take a plastic
spike used to anchor the mine in moving soil. It was suggested that the supervisor was
puzzled by it being different and screwed it back into the mine without thinking. [For details of
the plastic spike, click on "More" at the Mine/device field on the Incident/accident tab.]

Related papers
When interviewed during December 1999, a representative of the demining group said that
the victim had come to terms with his injuries well and confirmed that he had not suffered
significant throat or face injuries. During the same interview the demining group management
agreed that many deminers were inexperienced when recruited, but pointed out that "the
majority of deminers have now cleared more than 100 mines each".
From the fact that each deminer found more than 100 mines, I infer that Team Leaders
routinely dealt with disarming dozens of mines a day. The density of mines in the area being
cleared was exceptional, and it is partly the huge number of mines that led to the group's
policy of disarming for later demolition by burning.

The “crystallisation” explanation given by the demining group does not make immediate
sense. The researcher has dismantled many R2M2 mines in order to make detector testpieces (some shown above).

In several cases the ball bearing mechanism has jammed and although the balls are lined up
with their exit holes, they have not moved sideways to allow the spring-loaded pin to drop. In
these cases, they could move at any time – which may explain why the mine went off as the
supervisor unscrewed the booster charge. The picture alongside shows the mechanism with
the pin just visible above the detonator.
The demining group declined to give any details of compensation, which was reported to have
been "miserly".
In 2002 the Victim had been employed in the factory of a PPE manufacturer in Zimbabwe.
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